Civil Case 003: Ltin v. Feirmont

[Ltin]

Civil Case Form

1. Name of Plaintiff: Ltin

2. Name of Defendant: Feirmont

3. Please explain very briefly what the case is about: Whether the Nomination process of the July 2021 Legislature election was held in a manner consistent with the Elections Act

4. Which of your legal right(s) do you believe has been violated?: The right to elections which are held in accordance with the elections act.

5. What remedy are you seeking (leave blank if unsure): Accept the self-nomination of Ltin and hold a legislature election according to the Elections act.

6. Does any evidence in this case need to be submitted in private because it is classified or highly personal?: No

[Rogamark]

The case is accepted and before the Chief Justice. As this is an election matter, this case is going to move very fast.

First, as the plaintiff in, and thus a party to, this case, the temporarily-not-Honorable Ltin is recused from it. The defendant is Feirmont, this time not as Chief Executive, but rather in his capacity as the supervisor of the July 2021 Legislature election. Ltin has self-nominated as a candidate. That the nomination was rejected does not affect his standing, indeed it seems this rejection is what the case is all about. Candidates who feel their rights in an election have been violated do of course have standing to begin with.

As this case arises from an Elections Act dispute, a piece of statutory legislation which this Court may interpret and enforce, we have jurisdiction.

Will the parties represent themselves? If not, please name your representation.

[Feirmont]

Toms will be representing me in this case.

[Ltin]

I will be representing myself

[Rogamark]

Excellent! Mr. Ltin, you may give your opening statement. Please explain in what way(s) the Elections Act was violated, and how that may be proven. If forum posts are to be used as evidence, screenshots are not necessary, just as long as you point me to the exact post you're quoting from.

Oh, that reminds me. I'm ordering all threads within the Election Precinct connected to the Legislature election preserved. No edits, deletions, moving of threads, until the case is over.

[Ltin]

May it please the court,

At the end of July 2021 Legislature election nomination process, the Elections Act was violated when my self nomination was rejected. The relevant facts are as follows. The nominations process began entirely lawfully, and a time was set for the end of nominations.

Feirmont said:

Nominations will open up RIGHT NOW for Delegate and Legislature elections! The nomination process will continue until July 5th, 10:00 am MDT. Then, VOTING will start an hour later and will be open until July 9th, 10:00 am MDT.

When the stated time of 10:00 AM MDT arrived on July 5th, nominations were not announced as closed, nor did voting start at the announced time of an hour later. It was the next day that I nominated myself for the legislature (link). Only after that, at 8:35 AM MDT, were nominations formally announced as completed and closed. In that announcement, my nomination was rejected. The rational was clearly stated by Feirmont.

Feirmont said:

Although voting is late, the nomination period was clearly defined, so unfortunately Ltin's nomination is not accepted.

That raises a question: does the scheduled nomination period actually matter?

We should note that the word "will" was used to schedule both the nomination period and the voting period. The meaning of the word "will" in this context can be interpreted in two ways:

1. The thing (nominations or voting) is scheduled to begin/end at some time. However, events do not always go according to a schedule. Thus, though the intention is for it to actually begin/end then, it may not. It only really begins/end when the election supervisor actually begins/end it themselves.
2. The thing happens during the appointed time. Any nominations (or had the election been held, votes) outside the appointed time do not count.

Under the first interpretation, my nomination should have been accepted, since the nomination period, though it had been scheduled to end, hadn't actually been ended. It is this second interpretation which was applied to the nomination process. As my nomination took place after the appointed time, it was rejected. However, the word "will" was used twice to refer to both the nomination period and the voting period in the same context. For the word "will" to apply one interpretation in one sentence and a different interpretation in the very next is at best vague and at worst directly contradictory, so the only reasonable reading is that they must mean the same thing. So which interpretation should apply?

The elections act does not comment on this question with regards to the nomination period, but it does with regard to the voting period, where t Elections Act provides only for the first interpretation.

First off, note that in sections 7 and 9, when describing the beginning and end of the voting period, the word "scheduled" is used.

7. The Supervisor shall clearly announce in the nominations thread the time and date when voting is scheduled to commence, and shall instruct that candidates may begin campaigning immediately after declaring their candidacy.

9. Voting shall last no less than four (4) and no more than six (6) days. The Supervisor shall clearly announce in the voting thread the time and date when voting is scheduled to close.

Whether the voting period begins and ends at the scheduled times or when formally opened and closed is not directly commented on in the elections act, but we can infer whether it should based on section 20.

20. Notwithstanding the announced end date and time, any otherwise valid vote cast between opening and closing of the voting period is valid.

The meaning of this should be quite clear. All votes cast between the actual beginning and ending of the voting period count. It does not say that the beginning and ending of the voting period is the announced date and time. In fact, it says the exact opposite. The voting period does not begin or end when it is scheduled to begin; only when the election supervisor actually begins and ends it.

The Elections act does not force the election supervisor to apply this same principle to the nominations period, but it does permit the election supervisor to create additional rules, as long as they do not conflict with any provision in the Constitution or statutory law.

5. Any procedure shall be administered by a Supervisor, who must be a forum administrator or the Chief Executive or Delegate, in a manner consistent with this Act. The Supervisor may prescribe additional measures or procedures as long as they do not conflict with any constitutional or statutory provision.

As previously mentioned, the word "will" was used to describe both the end of the nomination period and the beginning of the voting period. When used in the same context, in two consecutive sentences, it is ridiculous to say that the word can mean two different things. Section 5 of the Elections act allows the election supervisor to apply the rules for the voting period to the nomination period, and that is the only reasonable way to read the announcement. Thus, the nominations period was open, until formally closed. My self nomination occurred before the formal closing, and thus must be accepted.

[Rogamark]

Thank you very much. Mr. Oms?

[TimS]

May it please the Court,

The Elections Act provides some rules regarding the nominations period for elections. First, section 6 requires the Supervisor to "provide for a place on the forum for nominations no less than four (4) and no more than six (6) days before the commencement of voting." In order to stand in an election, a person must first post in that place. Second, section 7 requires the Supervisor to "clearly announce in the nominations thread the time and date when voting is scheduled to commence."

The Supervisor created a thread for nominations at 9:27 am MDT on June 30th, in accordance with section 6. While voting did not actually take place, the end of the election was declared within the six-day maximum provided by section 6. The supervisor also announced the time and date that voting was scheduled to begin in the nominations thread, in accordance with section 7. Therefore, the rules regarding nomination threads provided by the Elections Act were followed.

The Elections Act also provides the Supervisor with the authority to "prescribe additional measures or procedures as long as they do not conflict with any constitutional or statutory provision." (Section 5). In this election, the Supervisor prescribed the following rules:

Nominations will open up RIGHT NOW for Delegate and Legislature elections! The nomination process will continue until July 5th, 10:00 am MDT.

While these rules were mixed in with other text designed to be instructional and maybe even entertaining, these particular statements are themselves rules put out under the authority of the Elections Act. The Elections Act itself provides no rules for how long the place for nominations must be kept open, or how long before voting begins the place for nominations can be closed, so long as the place for nominations exists within the time frame provided in section 6. The Supervisor could have instead mandated that nominations ended the moment voting began, or that the place for nominations would close a day before voting started. By picking a particular time for the nomination process to conclude, the Supervisor intended to prescribe a rule in addition, and not contrary to, those rules provided by the Elections Act.

Next, we must answer the question of what the rule means. The operative phrase is "will continue until" followed by a clear date and time. This plainly means that the nomination process will conclude at that specified time. Note in particular that the Supervisor did not state in this rule that the place for nominations would close with a follow-up post by the Supervisor, nor does any other statute require this. We agree that the word "will" is also used in the announcement of the date and time that voting is scheduled to commence. We also agree that the Supervisor's post announcing the end of the elections did not come at the announced time that voting was scheduled to commence. However, whether or not the Supervisor acted improperly in the voting process is not the dispute here, and is irrelevant to the question of the closing of nominations.

So, with the rule specifying that nominations ended at a certain time clearly prescribed, the nomination period ended at 10:00 am MDT on July 5th. When the nomination period ended, as defined by this rule, the place for nominations as defined in section 6 ceased to exist. The Elections Act states that Candidates stand in elections by posting in the place for nominations, and provides no other method for standing in elections. With the nominations closed in accordance with the Supervisor's rule, no other persons could post in the place for nominations, as that place no longer existed. Therefore, no person could stand in the election after the time stated in the Supervisor's rule. As Plaintiff's post occurred after the time provided in the Supervisor's rule, Plaintiff did not stand in the election and was not a candidate.

We thank the Court for its time.

[Rogamark]

Okay, it seems that both parties agree that the Elections Act is silent on how nominations outside an announced timeframe are to be handled - whereas votes outside an announced are addressed by section 20. Plaintiff makes no argument for analogous application per se, but points out that the announced start and end times are not the determinative goalposts for voting; rather, the act of opening and closing by the election supervisor is. 

Defense counsel counters that in the absence of a specific rule in the Elections Act, the election supervisor is free to set one within the statutory constraints per section 5.  Thus, if he announces an end date for the nomination period, and then chooses to reject late nominations as untimely, he is free to do so. He also states that it was indeed Defendant's intent to set an ad hoc rule here.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant used the exact same language for the announcement of the nomination close time and date, and the voting start time and date. It makes no sense, he says, to assume that in one sentence it is supposed to announce a rule, and right in the following sentence it merely communicates intent to open voting at a certain point in time. (The Court observes that voting did indeed start a little later than the announced TAD)

I have no questions at this point - both parties made themselves very clear, for which I commend them, though I would of course expect no less from the Attorney General and from a member of this very Court. But just like last time I will give both parties to briefly directly address/rebut each other's argument if they so wish - briefly because you do not need to restate your case. You both have argued, I now know why you think you're right, please now tell me why you think the other side is wrong. Parties will please also address me on the following: Mr. Oms said that there is nothing in the Elections Act that requires nominations and voting to be back-to-back, that there may well be a gap between the closing of one and the start of the other. Can parties please either disabuse me of, or reinforce, my notion that sections 6 and 7 require otherwise?

Mr. Ltin may go first.

Please also take this opportunity to point out to me if anything in my above summary is wrong. 

[Ltin]

May it please the court,

Though the Elections Act permits Election Supervisors to establish rules, that should not be interpreted to mean that rules can be established whenever the supervisor wants. I think it unreasonable to assume that was the intent of the writers of the Election Act for that to be the case. This supposed rule that nominations end at the stated time and no nominations after that time will be accepted was never explicitly stated until the moment it was being applied. I cannot say when the rule was devised by the election supervisor, but surely rules must be stated for them to be real. They cannot be a privately held secret, only revealed when they are to be applied, and that is especially true when they run contrary to reasonable assumptions. Absent any explicit declarations otherwise (where there was not, until the rule was being applied), it is reasonable to assume that nominations would occur in the same manner as the voting period would.

As to the question asked by the honorable Chief Justice, I must agree with Mr. Oms. A close reading of section 6 will find that the section provides a time period within which nominations must begin, but does not provide a minimum time period for which nominations shall remain open. This would seem to have the ability to be abused by an election supervisor acting in bad faith, but while I contend that Feirmont did act illegally, I do not believe him to have acted in bad faith. The time period within which nominations are open is certainly a rule which can be established by the Election Supervisor, and was in this case explicitly declared, though I point out that the rule in question, regarding whether nominations must be closed or are automatically closed, is a separate rule that must also have been declared, in as much as the rule that nominations automatically close runs contrary to reasonable expectations, as was previously stated.

[Rogamark]

Thank you. Mr. Oms?

[TimS]

Thank you, and may it please the Court:

The rule established by the Supervisor was not secret and was plainly stated in the place opened for nominations. To reach this conclusion, we shall start by examining the concept of the nomination period itself and then proceed logically.

The nominations thread is defined and given form solely by the Elections Act. While the practice of using the nomination thread goes far back before this iteration of the Government of Spiritus, and how these threads appeared and were used may have varied in practice over the years, the actual legal mechanisms of how the nomination thread functions must follow the law. section 6 of the Elections Act mandates the creation of this thread and states that it is the mechanism by which people can stand in an election. The Elections Act does not explicitly state that the nomination period ends. One could assume, then, that this nomination period goes on indefinitely. However, this would allow people to stand in an election as voting is occurring and even, theoretically, after voting is finished (even if doing so would have no effect as voting had already occurred). This, however, is patently absurd and cannot reasonably be described as the intent behind the Elections Act. Logically, then, the nominations thread must come to an end at some point, and after that point no one else can stand in the election.

Since the nominations thread can end, the next question is what can determine that ending? While not explicitly stated by the Elections Act, as discussed previously it is reasonable to believe that the nomination period ends when voting starts by default, as the alternative would be absurd. However, this is not the only event that can signal the end of the nomination period. We agree with the plaintiff that, so long as nominations are opened within the period required by section 6, nominations can end before the start of voting. Since this is not in dispute, both sides agree that the Supervisor can create a rule which closes nominations prior to it closing by default at the start of voting.

The final question is about the rule created by the Supervisor in this election: "The nomination process will continue until July 5th, 10:00 am MDT." Plaintiff acknowledges this rule and even describes it as a rule defining "[t]he time period within which nominations are open" yet also states that this rule does not lead to automatically closing the nomination period. If a rule defining the time at which the nomination period closes is not a rule mandating that the nomination period closes at a certain time, what is? There was no secret here, the time that the nomination period closed was clearly defined throughout the entire process by the Supervisor with more specificity than required by, or provided in, the Elections Act. The rule was clear, on its face, that the nomination period would end at a certain time. The requirement, or possibility of a requirement, that a post or other signal from the Supervisor was required to end the nomination period cannot be conjured up from nowhere. The rule ending the nomination period at a certain time was made clearly and publicly, and so the nomination period ended at that time.

Plaintiff argues that, in the absence of specific statements to the contrary, the nomination period should be run the same way the voting period is run. While we acknowledge here that the voting period was unusual, as there was no voting thread created for the legislature election and the the voting thread created for the Chief Justice retention vote was made later than indicated, the voting period itself and whether it was done properly or lawfully is not the dispute here. Plaintiff argues that the statement made by the Supervisor about the voting period ("[t]hen, VOTING will start an hour later and will be open until July 9th, 10:00 am MDT.") can only be read as a general scheduling notice. The nomination period statement, then, was also only a scheduling notice and not a rule closing elections. First, at least part of the statement regarding the voting period, the part stating when voting was to begin, was more than just a scheduling notice as that statement is required by the Elections Act. The rest of that statement, indicating when the voting was to end, while not required at that point in the nominations thread would eventually be required in the voting thread by section 9 of the Elections Act. This statement itself was also a rule, but one more intertwined in the existing statute. It was in part mandated by the Elections Act to state when the voting period would begin and in part created by the Supervisor to state when the voting period would end earlier than required by the statute. This entwinement is an important distinction between this rule and the nominations period rule. In addition, the Elections Act places more requirements on the Supervisor during the voting period, namely announcing the results of the voting at the conclusion of that period. This does not prevent the Supervisor from creating a rule stating the period during which the voting period will run, it just also requires that the Supervisor performs additional actions at the times created by the rule. Without those actions, the voting period may not end as defined by the Supervisor's rule, because the Elections Act takes precedence over any such rules. However, whether the rule and laws regarding the voting period was properly and legally followed, or whether the rule was legally changed and then followed, and all other related issues involving the voting period being administered are not at issue here. Further, the Elections Act does not place the same requirements on the nominations period as it does the voting period. At the time of creation, the nominations period rule and the voting period rule were both created to specify the times that those respective periods would open and close, regardless of any additional requirements or complexities required by or involved in the voting period.

The nominations period rule, considered on its own or in context, was a legally created rule that clearly stated when the nominations period would close. Totally regardless of voting period difficulties, the nominations period closed at that time, and no further persons could stand for elections.

We thank the Court for its time.

[Rogamark]

I thank both parties for their efforts; the case is now under advisement. As we're doing this bigly fastly, three (3) days for amicus briefs, until Wednesday July 14, 14:00 EST.

[Rogamark]

Rogamark, Chief Justice


Civil Case 003 - heard by the Chief Justice sitting alone under sections 6f. of the Judiciary Act, with the Hon. Ltin recused as a party in the case - comes before us in the wake of the July 2021 Legislature election. Plaintiff alleges that the election supervisor's rejection of his self-nomination was unlawful. Chair Potato Louisistan has filed an amicus brief.

Election supervisors are one-man governments unto themselves, however temporarily and for a very limited purpose. When they announce rules and prescribe procedures, they are legislatures. When they apply the Elections Act, they are executives. And when they issue rulings such as the one in this case, they are judiciaries. I have thus wrestled with the question which standard of review applies. I'm opting for de novo review, out of the practical consideration that anything else would unduly burden any non-lawyer Spiritusianite who wishes to seek legal review of an electoral matter.

I.

Defendant Feirmont, in his capacity as election supervisor, administered said election. The instruction he gave was, in relevant part: "Nominations will open up RIGHT NOW for Delegate and Legislature elections! The nomination process will continue until July 5th, 10:00 am MDT. Then, VOTING will start an hour later and will be open until July 9th, 10:00 am MDT.".

Plaintiff self-nominated after the expiration of the 'until' date, but before voting had started. Defendant later rejected the self-nomination as untimely, and opened voting without Plaintiff on the ballot. Defense counsel explained that an election supervisor is entitled to set additional rules for the electoral process as long as they do not conflict with constitutional or statutory law, and that this has happened here.

Plaintiff contends that no rule has been announced, and that the instructions were merely a declaration of intent, as is evident by the fact that a start time and date for voting was announced using the exact same language as for the nominations period, and yet it started later. Further, he argues that while there is no language on point in the Elections Act, section 20 - which deals with the voting phase - should inform the Court's interpretation. Defense counsel's counter-argument is that nominations and voting are separate processes, and there is no reason why they should operate under the exact same rules.

II.

One great difficulty in resolving this case is that, in my view, both parties as well as the amicus likely misconstrue section 6 of the Elections Act, perhaps led astray by the language that describes nominations and voting as separate 'periods'. It provides "nominations no less than four (4) and no more than six (6) days before the commencement of voting." (emphasis added)

I will not rule at this point on the exact relationship between nominations and voting as the case can be resolved on narrower grounds. For now, suffice it to observe that for administrative reasons alone, election supervisors often actively close nominations before opening the vote, owing to the simple fact that one needs an exhaustive list of candidates before one can fashion the ballot. Both Spiritus practice and the fact that it is not possible to conduct an election any other way strongly suggest that this is proper. In the case before us, there was not just such a natural gap, however; rather, Defendant intended to have an one-hour delay. The question is whether such a delay is permissible.

III.

While I have an opinion on that, I need not reach that question either because in any event, the announcement was functionally defective. Closing nominations earlier than mere minutes before voting starts is rather unusual for Spiritus elections; and outright rejecting nominations is a stark departure from usual practice for which there is no even halfway recent precedent, if there is precedent at all.

A candidate could and would have reasonably relied on the assumption that this election would be run in the same manner as usual, and a substantial change would be announced very clearly. Due to the fact that we are all adults with more or less busy lives, there is always some play in the joints, and announced end times and dates tend to be mere declarations of intent rather than hard deadlines. The Court infers from the fact that the election supervisor himself opened voting (on the one election that was actually necessary) a bit later than at the announced time and date, due to RL circumstances, that he is well aware of that. Indeed, I cannot help but observe that there is a certain irony in rejecting a nomination as untimely in the very same post in which the rejecting election supervisor opens voting belatedly.

In any event, Plaintiff is correct that the language in the announcement did not convey that at least one of the announced end times and dates would be strictly enforced this time. And an ambiguously announced rule is void, obviating the need to dig deeper into the other questions.

IV.

I do believe that this was an honest mistake on part of the election supervisor. No party suggested any kind of intentional malfeasance, and indeed there is no doubt in the mind of the Court that Defendant acted in good faith. Nor does the Court question that Defendant did intend to announce a rule. In the absence of even the faintest evidence to the contrary, the Court owes some due deference to an election supervisor's word.

Nonetheless, at the end of the day Plaintiff relied to his detriment on an ambiguous announcement that sought to set a rule that departs markedly from usual Spiritus practice. As a result, he was unable to stand in the July 2021 Legislature election. In light of the fact that the taproot error from which his predicament springs grows early in the process, at the nominations stage, the only sufficient remedy is to invalidate that Legislature election in its entirety. It is to be held anew, as if the Legislature election for this term had not occurred yet.

Judgment for the PLAINTIFF.


The election supervisors are DIRECTED to re-conduct the July 2021 Legislature election. The foregoing order is STAYED for 72 hours from the publication of this judgment pending potential notices of appeal.

[TimS]

The defendant moves for this case to be reheard under section 15 of the Court's procedural rules.